fundamental alteration of the 'capitalist' system in the
West. There are also further substantive issues which would need to be, or could be, addressed--alternative funding vehicles upon retirement; and the alternative use of AAA corporate bonds versus U.S. Treasuries dependent upon assessment of the validity of the historical data, current and projected levels of issuances and magnitudes outstanding, and liquidity
impacts; also, the inherent variances to be expected in 40-year Final
Wealth Indexes will need appropriate smoothings in the benefits
calculations. I leave these matters to the Office of the Chief Actuary and others.
Stock-portfolio management. The questions arise: who will manage these stock funds? Individuals, professionals, or the Government? Will individual stocks (or mutual funds) be allowed or only broad index
funds? My preliminary answers would be: professionals and index funds,
both to be selected by the individual covered workers within broad but
protective requirements. If only index funds, then the next possible
problem arises:
Overconcentration in index funds. Thoughtful people have advocated the exclusive use of indexed investments in retirement funds.
When ERISA was signed by the U.S. president on Labor Day in the Rose
Garden in 1974, the whole new profession of ERISA law and lawyering was
spawned. Some early attorneys took the position that using anything
else except index funds in the stock portion of private-sector pension
funds would be a fiduciary breach under the law. Robert A.G. Monks,
Pension Administrator in the first Bush administration, held that, in
general--not just with respect to retirement funds--investment by large
institutional portfolio managers was best accomplished by index-fund
investing when it came to stocks.
To be sure, the more dollars which are invested in index funds, the
greater will be the volatility of prices of both the indexes and their
component stocks. What happens when the last dollar goes into the last, giant index fund? That will not happen. There will always be distinctly investment dollars and speculative dollars--with enough speculative dollars worldwide to game the market, resulting in continual oscillation in the transaction characteristics of the market. (But it is here, in this overconcentration, that LUE would most likely to emerge.)
Fundamental alteration of the 'capitalist' system in the West. It is hard to imagine that a time may come when the concept
and fact of capital disappears from the Great Tripartite Basis of Economic Theory which--like 'All Gaul'--is divided into three parts.
Capital, Labor, and Tools. Social, economic, and political history are
replete with temporary milestones of events, eras, developments,
and artifacts which were considered impossible or unimaginable prior to
their actual arrival on the scene of human history. (See in the Notes
below "Bond Safety: Sovereign Power vs. Corporate Resilience.")
4/
Conclusion
Stock returns are always larger than bonds'. Stocks are just as safe as bonds for actuarial purposes. Stocks beat inflation in all instances. It is prudent and appropriate to use them in selected private accounts in the U.S. Social Security System.
*
Click here
for the companion article
which proposes a solution to the existing system.
You may freely copy and redistribute this article in whole or in part provided you please include the publisher's copyright notice and web address at the beginning or end of your copied portion, thus--
© 2000-02 The 2000 Corporation. More at 'Copernicus'.
http://www.advanced-stock-selection.com/
Sources.
Global Financial Data, Inc. supplied the raw data upon which the calculations in my three tables were made. The Office of the Chief Actuary of the Social Security Administration supplied some of the data appearing
in the Notes.
Table 3.
Final Wealth Indices, Annual Returns, and Related CPI
All 40-year Periods 1871-1999
Ending Value of $1 Contributed Annually
Updated through 2005 available
here
|
Period |
Wealth Index |
Cum |
Real Wealth |
|
Annual % Return* |
|
Ending |
Stocks |
Bonds |
CPI |
Stocks |
Bonds |
|
Stocks |
Bonds |
CPI |
|
1911 |
203 |
86 |
49 |
154 |
36 |
|
6.8 |
3.0 |
1.1 |
|
1912 |
207 |
85 |
51 |
157 |
34 |
|
7.0 |
3.0 |
1.1 |
|
1913 |
178 |
84 |
52 |
126 |
32 |
|
5.2 |
3.0 |
1.2 |
|
1914 |
161 |
83 |
52 |
109 |
31 |
|
4.4 |
3.0 |
1.2 |
|
1915 |
206 |
83 |
53 |
153 |
30 |
|
7.7 |
3.1 |
1.3 |
|
1916 |
211 |
82 |
59 |
153 |
23 |
|
7.5 |
3.0 |
1.5 |
|
1917 |
146 |
81 |
69 |
78 |
12 |
|
3.4 |
3.0 |
1.9 |
|
1918 |
169 |
76 |
82 |
88 |
-6 |
|
5.9 |
2.3 |
2.4 |
|
1919 |
187 |
74 |
92 |
95 |
-18 |
|
7.2 |
2.2 |
2.6 |
|
1920 |
143 |
75 |
93 |
50 |
-17 |
|
3.9 |
2.6 |
2.6 |
|
1921 |
157 |
82 |
81 |
75 |
1 |
|
5.3 |
3.6 |
2.2 |
|
1922 |
190 |
82 |
78 |
112 |
4 |
|
7.5 |
3.5 |
2.2 |
|
1923 |
186 |
84 |
79 |
107 |
5 |
|
6.7 |
3.6 |
2.3 |
|
1924 |
223 |
87 |
78 |
145 |
9 |
|
8.6 |
3.8 |
2.4 |
|
1925 |
269 |
89 |
79 |
190 |
10 |
|
10.4 |
4.0 |
2.5 |
|
1926 |
289 |
91 |
77 |
212 |
15 |
|
10.3 |
4.1 |
2.5 |
|
1927 |
372 |
92 |
73 |
299 |
19 |
|
12.7 |
4.1 |
2.4 |
|
1928 |
509 |
89 |
71 |
438 |
18 |
|
15.5 |
3.6 |
2.3 |
|
1929 |
437 |
91 |
70 |
366 |
21 |
|
11.9 |
3.9 |
2.4 |
|
1930 |
307 |
92 |
65 |
243 |
27 |
|
7.5 |
3.9 |
2.2 |
|
1931 |
161 |
89 |
58 |
103 |
32 |
|
1.5 |
3.5 |
2.0 |
|
1932 |
139 |
91 |
51 |
88 |
40 |
|
1.2 |
3.7 |
1.8 |
|
1933 |
201 |
93 |
50 |
151 |
43 |
|
6.3 |
3.9 |
1.8 |
|
1934 |
182 |
95 |
50 |
132 |
45 |
|
4.9 |
4.1 |
1.9 |
|
1935 |
246 |
95 |
51 |
195 |
44 |
|
8.9 |
4.0 |
2.0 |
|
1936 |
299 |
94 |
51 |
248 |
43 |
|
10.7 |
3.7 |
2.0 |
|
1937 |
175 |
94 |
51 |
124 |
43 |
|
4.1 |
3.8 |
2.1 |
|
1938 |
213 |
96 |
49 |
164 |
47 |
|
7.2 |
3.9 |
2.0 |
|
1939 |
194 |
94 |
48 |
146 |
46 |
|
6.0 |
3.7 |
1.9 |
|
1940 |
162 |
95 |
47 |
114 |
48 |
|
4.2 |
3.8 |
1.9 |
|
1941 |
133 |
94 |
51 |
82 |
43 |
|
2.7 |
3.5 |
2.0 |
|
1942 |
152 |
92 |
55 |
98 |
38 |
|
4.8 |
3.4 |
2.2 |
|
1943 |
181 |
91 |
55 |
126 |
36 |
|
6.8 |
3.3 |
2.2 |
|
1944 |
201 |
90 |
55 |
146 |
35 |
|
7.8 |
3.2 |
2.2 |
|
1945 |
258 |
92 |
55 |
203 |
37 |
|
10.4 |
3.4 |
2.2 |
|
1946 |
224 |
89 |
63 |
160 |
26 |
|
7.6 |
3.1 |
2.5 |
|
1947 |
223 |
85 |
67 |
156 |
18 |
|
7.4 |
2.7 |
2.7 |
|
1948 |
216 |
84 |
68 |
148 |
17 |
|
7.1 |
2.7 |
2.7 |
|
1949 |
240 |
85 |
64 |
175 |
21 |
|
8.3 |
2.9 |
2.5 |
|
1950 |
296 |
81 |
67 |
229 |
15 |
|
10.4 |
2.5 |
2.7 |
|
1951 |
345 |
78 |
69 |
276 |
10 |
|
11.4 |
2.3 |
2.8 |
|
1952 |
384 |
78 |
67 |
316 |
10 |
|
11.8 |
2.3 |
2.7 |
|
1953 |
357 |
77 |
66 |
291 |
11 |
|
10.1 |
2.3 |
2.7 |
|
1954 |
505 |
76 |
64 |
441 |
12 |
|
14.3 |
2.4 |
2.6 |
|
1955 |
612 |
73 |
63 |
549 |
11 |
|
15.5 |
2.0 |
2.6 |
|
1956 |
612 |
70 |
63 |
549 |
7 |
|
14.1 |
1.7 |
2.4 |
|
1957 |
513 |
72 |
63 |
450 |
8 |
|
11.1 |
2.2 |
2.1 |
|
1958 |
671 |
68 |
64 |
608 |
5 |
|
14.6 |
1.8 |
1.8 |
|
1959 |
692 |
65 |
64 |
628 |
0 |
|
14.0 |
1.4 |
1.6 |
|
1960 |
645 |
69 |
65 |
581 |
4 |
|
12.4 |
2.4 |
1.5 |
|
1961 |
740 |
68 |
64 |
676 |
4 |
|
14.0 |
2.3 |
1.7 |
|
1962 |
613 |
70 |
64 |
548 |
5 |
|
11.3 |
2.6 |
1.8 |
|
1963 |
692 |
68 |
65 |
627 |
4 |
|
12.7 |
2.4 |
1.8 |
|
1964 |
737 |
69 |
65 |
672 |
4 |
|
13.1 |
2.5 |
1.8 |
|
1965 |
767 |
67 |
65 |
702 |
2 |
|
13.0 |
2.3 |
1.8 |
|
1966 |
647 |
69 |
67 |
581 |
2 |
|
10.4 |
2.5 |
1.9 |
|
1967 |
757 |
65 |
68 |
689 |
-3 |
|
12.2 |
2.0 |
2.0 |
|
1968 |
803 |
64 |
70 |
733 |
-5 |
|
12.1 |
2.0 |
2.1 |
|
1969 |
712 |
60 |
73 |
639 |
-13 |
|
9.8 |
1.2 |
2.2 |
|
1970 |
713 |
69 |
76 |
638 |
-7 |
|
9.6 |
3.0 |
2.5 |
|
1971 |
774 |
74 |
77 |
698 |
-2 |
|
10.3 |
3.7 |
2.8 |
|
1972 |
833 |
74 |
77 |
755 |
-3 |
|
11.3 |
3.4 |
3.2 |
|
1973 |
627 |
74 |
82 |
545 |
-7 |
|
8.1 |
3.3 |
3.5 |
|
1974 |
421 |
75 |
89 |
332 |
-14 |
|
4.4 |
3.3 |
3.9 |
|
1975 |
523 |
77 |
92 |
431 |
-15 |
|
8.0 |
3.5 |
4.0 |
|
1976 |
601 |
87 |
93 |
508 |
-6 |
|
9.5 |
4.6 |
4.2 |
|
1977 |
524 |
85 |
96 |
428 |
-11 |
|
7.3 |
4.0 |
4.3 |
|
1978 |
505 |
82 |
101 |
404 |
-19 |
|
7.4 |
3.4 |
4.8 |
|
1979 |
550 |
80 |
110 |
440 |
-30 |
|
8.6 |
3.2 |
5.5 |
|
1980 |
665 |
78 |
119 |
546 |
-41 |
|
10.9 |
2.8 |
6.1 |
|
1981 |
562 |
78 |
124 |
438 |
-46 |
|
8.7 |
2.9 |
6.1 |
|
1982 |
587 |
109 |
124 |
464 |
-14 |
|
10.0 |
6.8 |
5.8 |
|
1983 |
622 |
108 |
123 |
499 |
-15 |
|
11.1 |
5.7 |
5.8 |
|
1984 |
578 |
122 |
123 |
455 |
-1 |
|
10.3 |
6.6 |
5.9 |
|
1985 |
671 |
154 |
123 |
548 |
31 |
|
12.4 |
8.8 |
6.0 |
|
1986 |
717 |
183 |
119 |
597 |
64 |
|
12.7 |
9.8 |
5.1 |
|
1987 |
663 |
171 |
121 |
542 |
51 |
|
11.6 |
8.0 |
4.9 |
|
1988 |
671 |
176 |
122 |
549 |
54 |
|
12.1 |
7.8 |
5.0 |
|
1989 |
756 |
203 |
124 |
633 |
79 |
|
14.0 |
9.0 |
5.3 |
|
1990 |
627 |
210 |
127 |
501 |
83 |
|
11.7 |
8.6 |
5.4 |
|
1991 |
714 |
239 |
126 |
588 |
113 |
|
13.7 |
9.6 |
5.2 |
|
1992 |
677 |
250 |
126 |
551 |
124 |
|
12.7 |
9.3 |
5.3 |
|
1993 |
660 |
272 |
125 |
535 |
147 |
|
12.4 |
9.7 |
5.4 |
|
1994 |
581 |
242 |
124 |
457 |
118 |
|
11.2 |
7.7 |
5.6 |
|
1995 |
722 |
290 |
122 |
600 |
168 |
|
14.0 |
9.6 |
5.7 |
|
1996 |
814 |
281 |
122 |
692 |
160 |
|
14.7 |
8.6 |
5.7 |
|
1997 |
994 |
297 |
119 |
875 |
178 |
|
16.4 |
8.9 |
5.7 |
|
1998 |
1142 |
321 |
116 |
1026 |
204 |
|
17.3 |
9.4 |
5.7 |
|
1999 |
1272 |
283 |
115 |
1157 |
168 |
|
17.4 |
7.4 |
5.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Avg |
|
9.7 |
4.1 |
3.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
StDev |
|
3.6 |
2.3 |
1.5 |
|
* Annual % Returns are the summation of the averages of each year's component returns in current dollars divided by 40. Note the anomaly in 1931, 1932 and 1941 when stock returns appear lower than those of bonds. This is due to relative differences in the magnitudes of the components of the Wealth Index series vs the Annual % Return series. The extra effort to create a custom internal-rate-of-return algorithm is not necessary to do here. For actuarial purposes, a four-year smoothing eliminates the discrepancy if one desires. But it is not needed. The Final Wealth Index governs.
To calculate the real advantage of stocks for the average retiree, divide column 5 by the absolute value in column 6 for each year. The result is the multiple each retirement year by which the final wealth credited to each retiree's account in stocks
exceeds bonds in purchasing power. The average multiple is 60.1
times for stocks over bonds over the 129-year period.
Private accounts and the additional cost of
administration. Such costs are neglible. Presently, the U.S.
Social Security Administration costs are running around 0.23%
annually. The additional cost burden of individual
investment-account tracking for plan participants should cost
somewhere in the range of Vanguard's annual expense ratios of 0.06% to 0.12% currently for this type of investments. The revised system
envisaged here remains essentially a defined-benefits program but with aspects of privatized, individualized control incorporated into it. Its best applicability will be to new cohorts of participants entering the system. But the thematic structure could be easily adapted to other age cohorts already entered into the work-retirement cycle.
This table is updated through 2005 here.
|
Notes
1 Taxes. The current system by law is raising the normal retirement age to 67 with probably more to come instead of reducing the
retirement age as I am suggesting. The current system takes taxes from
wages in the amount of 10.7% from employers and employees for retirement-income insurance plus 1.7% for disability insurance for a total of 12.4% in taxes on wages--over $450 billion in 1999. This system is expected by the Office of the Chief Actuary of the Social Security Administration to go
broke in the year
2039.
2 Major
corporations in the private sector of the U.S. have long used
overweightings of stocks in their pension trusts, both well before and
after ERISA. Delta Air Lines, for example, as early as pre-1970, through
their visionary actuary Blackburn Hazlehurst in Atlanta, was using a 10%
return assumption for their pension investments and was one of the first
corporations in the U.S. to allow 100% investment in stocks--to the
great benefit of their retirees, workers, and shareholders.
3 The current system expects in future
years to pay out benefits at a level equal to 41.9% of earnings in
the year of retirement, up from the 39.2% level currently in effect
(the U.S. Social Security Administration Chief Actuary's figures) as of
date of this writing. With stocks returning two to three times the
return from bonds, there is abundant margin, including allowance for
increased administrative costs, to make the system whole and for all
future wage earners entering the work force to receive retirement
benefits equal to more than 80% (rather than 41.9%) of final wages--and
after 40 years of work rather than 45 years.
80% of final wages is calculated with extreme crudity
(requisite refinements may be made by actuaries with the historical data
and appropriate mathematical instruments in their arsenals) as follows.
The March 31, 2001, median of wages and
salaries of all full-time workers age 16 and over in the United States
(BLS) is
$30,784 (weekly data annualized). Multiply by 80%. This gives a median
annual retirement benefit of $24,627 for all those retiring on this date
who have worked 40 years. The wealth need to produce that amount of
annual income from principal invested at 5% is $492,544.
The worst Final Cumulative Wealth Index for stocks in real buying power during nearly a full century up to the present is 50.3 in 1920. To find out the total contributions (taxes) required over 40 years to produce $492,544, divide by 1920 current dollars Final Wealth Index for Stocks, 143.8 (the value of $1 invested in stocks each year for 40 years over the period from 1880 to 1920). The answer is $3,449 per year. This amounts to 11.2% of wages per year in 1920 dollars using the 2001 median wage as the 1920 base for final-pay.*
One can see there is tremendous latitude here to effectuate some combination of reducing taxes, raising benefits, shortening the number of years required to work, building actuarially adequate pools of reserves allocable to equity or fixed-income-securities (U.S. Treasuries or otherwise) for the purpose of providing survivors' and disability insurance, some kind of a minimum guaranteed living wage for those who do not work the full 40 (or N number) years, and for perhaps smoothing out the disparities of benefits of cohorts of workers retiring in different years.
* Example amended March 2002
4 Bond Safety: Sovereign Power vs. Corporate
Resilience It is standard practice in the investments industry to
attribute higher safety ratings to government bonds than to high-grade
corporate bonds. This is a fallacy. The extra safety feature of
Treasuries over corporates presumes to rest on the sovereign power to
tax. Government has the power to legislate taxes to whatever level is
necessary to guarantee bond payment. Corporations cannot. Their
guarantee of safety rests solely on their ability to earn sufficient
profits to cover their obligations.
But
the level of tax revenues depends upon the health of a country's
underlying national economy which in turn rests on its political-social
structure. The state cannot get more taxes out of a population than its
population produces or is willing to pay. Russia and Ecuador are recent
examples of sovereign default. Their government guarantees became
worthless. As recently as the 1970's, United Kingdom sovereign bonds
traded at a higher yield than UK corporates indicating they were less
safe than the corporates. A remarkable event for the once heretofore
mightiest empire--with the soundest currecy--in the world.
When a national economy stops thriving, its
government bonds are at risk. When an economy thrives, corporate bonds
are a safe and superb bargain because of the misplaced premium they
enjoy over governments. When the economy or political structure fails,
safety lies across the border, not in the fallacious higher quality
ratings of sovereign bonds.
Do these
dangers threaten the United States? Probably not, for four reasons: its
people, its capital markets, its technology, its institutions. Although
the latter have been under steady and growing assault since the Great
Depression of the 1930's and the World War which followed, the native
independence, innovativeness, resilience, and common-senseness of its people will probably extend preservation of the U.S. structure into
another epoch.
Marx and Engels erred when they ignored the potential emerging impact of the "tools" portion of the classical equation: capital, labor, tools. They and many others failed to see these three concepts transforming into today's modern equivalents: finance, consumers, and technology. The new power and operative nuances with which these three interlock now far outpace the lagging state of current economic-politico-social theory. Marx would smile to see it.
As to my earlier
allusion (in the first part of the article) that the system could be
fundamentally altered, that the concept and fact of 'capital' may
disappear from the equation, leaving only consumers and technology,
consider this. Information increases exponentially as mind workers,
their knowledge, and their tools proliferate. Information transfers to and transforms physical processes and techniques--farming, medicine, manufacturing, transportation, distribution, and communications. Thus--
Physical technique approaches
threshholds beyond which the individual becomes sufficiently
self-empowered to create personal, instant realities in these areas.
Further, and as a result, as information is ubiquitous and so cheap it is free, physical techniques similarly become ubiquitous, cheap, and free. The individual arrives at the ability to create anything he wishes immediately virtually with the speed of thought. (At NEC Research Institute, Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.A., in quantum-optics research experiments into the speed of light waves in May, 2000, NEC reports "the peak of the pulse appears to leave the cell before entering it". Something happens before it happens. Imagine that on your desktop.)
*
Written by 'Copernicus'
July 16-September 4, 2000
Additional material June 2001, March 2002
Orlando, Florida, U.S.A.
407-896-4114 (if I'm not in Poland or Rimini)
--4545 words--
Errata: Table 2., error in the
CPI lowest inflation datum and the Ratio St/CPI
corrected April 23, 2005.
First paragraph, error stating the magnitude of
stocks' earnings superiority
corrected May 16, 2005.
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